Aras Canipek
I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at Sabanci Business School and a research affiliate at the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE. Previously, I was a postdoctoral researcher at SAFE and Columbia University.
My research interests include empirical corporate finance, capital markets regulation, law and economics, and entrepreneurial finance.
Email: aras.canipek@sabanciuniv.edu
Working Papers
The Accredited Investor Definition, Private Investments, and Wealth Inequality in the US
I study household finances around the income eligibility rules of the accredited investor definition that allow only high-income households access to private investments. Such investments have recently been linked to higher returns and the increase in wealth inequality. My analysis shows that access to private markets increases private investments. The result provides an answer to an important question in the literature and politics: differences in private investments are not only caused by differences in abilities and tastes between wealthy and poor households, but also simply by access to private investments. Moreover, I find discontinuities in wealth and returns. Eligible households exhibit relative increases in the private investments to assets ratio, net wealth, and returns by 6.2pp, 39%, and 1.0pp, respectively. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the accredited investor definition can explain important parts of recent increases in wealth inequality.
Conferences: 6th Annual RCF-ECGI Conference
Bankruptcy Law Penalties and Board Independence
A large theoretical literature suggests that bankruptcy law penalties can reduce agency problems, yet evidence remains scarce. To provide evidence, I examine whether firms implement independent directors as a substitute when penalties are eliminated. For identification, I exploit that penalties are relevant only for risky firms. Across countries, board independence is negatively related to penalties, but only among risky firms. Comparing board independence of risky and safe firms around bankruptcy reforms in Germany, Italy, and the US confirms the results. Economically, risky firms increase the number of independent directors by 21% relative to safe firms following the elimination of penalties.
Featured in: Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable
Dual-Class Firms, Agency Problems, and Debt Governance: Evidence from Korea
I examine whether debt (or, more generally, a performance threshold) can reduce agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in dual-class firms. To do so, I use two key features of debt governance. First, it is only effective with bankruptcy penalties, second, it only matters for firms close to default. I measure agency problems by the voting premium. Using a Korean bankruptcy reform that reduced penalties, I find that risky firms exhibited a 59% increase in the voting premium after the reform relative to safe firms. My findings have important implications for the heated debate on dual-class share structure.
Nature-Related Risks in Syndicated Lending
(with Santanu Kundu, Jiri Tresl, and Lukas Zimmermann)
We examine whether banks price firms’ dependence on nature. We find that loan spreads are higher for firms with greater dependence, a 1% increase in dependence corresponds to an increase of 0.32% in loan spreads. We provide causal evidence by using two quasi-natural experiments that change lenders’ information and firms’ costs of nature dependence. Higher dependence is also associated with stricter non-price terms, such as shorter maturities and collateral requirements.
Conferences: Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction and Corporate Finance 2025, AEA 2025, AFA 2026, Conference on Biodiversity in Finance and Accounting at the Goethe University and SAFE 2025, Conference on Climate- and Nature-Related Risks at the Banque de France 2026, French Inter-Business School Seminar 2026, GRASFI 2025, ICSDBE 2026
(with Axel Kind, Lubomir Litov, and Jiri Tresl)
Weaker creditor rights can increase credit costs and thus prompt firms to reduce debt and investment. Yet, they can reduce distress costs and thus allow firms to increase leverage and eliminate risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. We hypothesize that firm size influences the effect of creditor rights on credit costs and distress costs and thus which effect dominates. Weaker creditor rights should have a positive effect for large firms but a negative effect for small firms. Using a German bankruptcy reform, we find support for our hypothesis. Our findings reconcile mixed evidence and have important implications for optimal bankruptcy design.
Featured in: Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable, Oxford Business Law Blog
Conferences: AFFI 2018, ALEA 2019, CELSE 2018, COMPIE 2021, FMA 2018, IRMC 2020, JLFA 2018, Law and Macroeconomics Conference 2020
Work in Progress
The New Special Study of the Securities Markets
(with Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, and Edward Greene)